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COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY AND SOUNDNESS IN EUROPEAN LIFE INSURANCE 
MARKETS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and 
competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone 
indicator. We analyze 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation 
period 1999-2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life 
insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of 
profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the 
mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-
enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones.  
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Highlights: 
 
 This is the first cross-country study analysing the effects of competition on soundness in 
the insurance industry by investigating the EU life insurance markets. 
 Competition increases the soundness of European Union life insurance markets over the 
period 1999-2011. 
 Efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. 
 The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for financially weak insurers. 
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Competition, Efficiency and Soundness in European Life Insurance Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed a deregulation process – particularly through the 
European Union’s (EU) Third Generation Insurance Directives implemented in July 1994 – with 
a view to creating a single European insurance market. The main goal of deregulation was to 
increase competition in order to enhance products and services and to result in better 
diversification of underwriting and investment risks, which would have a positive effect on 
consumers by increasing the choice of insurance products (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). 
The deregulation of the insurance market led to an increase in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
in this sector, particularly towards the end of the 1990s (Cummins and Weiss, 2004; Cummins et 
al. , 2015). It also resulted in increased cross-border trade in insurance and has transformed the 
structure of the European insurance market. On the one hand, M&As have led to a market with 
more consolidated firms, and on the other, the opening up of these markets has exposed 
insurance companies to higher cross-border competition. It is clear that in both cases, one would 
expect to see higher levels of efficiency in the market: one of the objectives of M&As is to 
benefit from efficiency gains while increased competition raises efficiency levels by disciplining 
the market.  
If such competition has resulted in a reallocation of profits from inefficient to efficient 
firms, one would hope to see an improvement in the financial stability (soundness) of the market, 
with efficiency being the conduit through which competition contributes to financial stability. 
The life insurers’ soundness is of major importance for policyholders that are very sensitive to 
the reliability of the respective firms because most life insurance policies have a long life span. 
However, solvency is also important for other stakeholders, such as investors and policymakers. 
Although the contagion effects from failures of insurers may not be as consequential as in the 
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banking industry (Chen et al., 2013), they have significant potential to disrupt the financial 
system and negatively impact the economy (Das et al., 2003). This justifies policy makers in 
endorsing supervisions and regulations to reduce insolvency risk and to promote confidence in 
the financial stability of the insurance industry. European insurers have just implemented 
Solvency II, a risk-based economic approach with the aims of adopting solvency requirements 
that better reflect the risks that companies face and to deliver a supervisory system that is 
consistent across member states. In addition, with the financial crisis, a new round of discussion 
on the soundness of European insurers focuses not only on the protection of policyholders but 
also on the contribution of the insurance sector to the stability of the financial system. 
The aim of this paper is to understand how competition has evolved in the life insurance 
sector in the light of the deregulation process and to test the relationship between competition 
and soundness in the European life insurance market. The analysis is carried out in two parts: (i) 
we estimate the Boone (2008) indicator of competition in 10 European life insurance markets 
over the period 1999-2011. The Boone indicator captures the impact of competition on the 
performance of efficient insurers, consistent with the industrial organization literature, which 
demonstrates that competition reallocates profits from inefficient to efficient firms (Olley and 
Pakes, 1996; Stiroh, 2000); (ii) we investigate the nexus between competition and soundness. In 
doing so, we estimate a general class of panel data models where the dependent variable is a 
measure of insurance soundness (calculated by the Z-score) and we use as independent variables 
the Boone competition indicator as well as a set of insurance-and-country-specific variables. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing the first analysis in the insurance 
industry of the effects of competition on soundness, where efficiency is considered as the 
transmission mechanism through which competition can contribute to soundness. Efficiency is 
often used as an indirect measure of competition. While a few studies have investigated the 
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efficiency of European insurance companies using frontier measurement methods (e.g. Fenn et 
al., 2008; Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2016), to the best of our knowledge, only Bikker and Van 
Leuvensteijn (2008) and Bikker (2016) have applied the Boone indicator in the context of the 
(Dutch life) insurance industry. Thus, our paper is the first attempt to understand the evolution of 
competition in the insurance industry in a cross-country context using the Boone indicator, a 
relatively novel approach to measuring competition. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background 
and a review of the literature; section 3 describes the empirical modelling strategy; and section 4 
details the sample and the variables used in the analysis. The results are discussed in section 5, 
and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Background and Literature Review 
It is a well-established argument in the industrial organization literature that competition 
tends to trigger reallocations of profits from inefficient to efficient firms (Olley and Pakes, 1996; 
Stiroh, 2000). More efficient firms outperform their less efficient counterparts in terms of profits, 
hence fostering industry-wide efficiency. Many of the “direct” measures of competition 
traditionally employed in the industrial organisation literature such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, concentration ratios, or the price-cost margin are known to suffer from theoretical and 
empirical difficulties. In particular, they have been increasingly recognised as being non-
monotonic measures of competition. The recent empirical literature on financial institutions that 
measures competition through concentration levels has shown the link between concentration 
and competition to be ambiguous (e.g., Berger et al., 2004).1  
Recently, Boone (2008) developed a novel approach to measuring competition that 
overcomes the shortcomings of these proxies. Boone’s methodology (also referred to as the 
                                                          
1 Traditionally, higher concentration levels were associated with lack of competition. But if higher competition 
forces firms to consolidate, concentration would be positively related to competition.  
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profits elasticity approach) is grounded in the efficient structure hypothesis and the idea that 
competition rewards efficiency: an efficient firm will gain a higher market share and realise 
higher profits than a less efficient one.2 Firms are punished more harshly for being inefficient. 
Hence, in more competitive markets, efficient firms perform better – in terms of market share 
and profits – than inefficient firms. Consequently, the Boone indicator captures the idea that 
more efficient firms achieve superior performance at the expense of their less efficient 
counterparts, and this effect is monotonically increasing in the degree of competition when firms 
interact more aggressively and when entry barriers decline. 
The European life insurance industry provides a particularly interesting environment in 
which to analyse the effects of competition. In the insurance industry, since the founding of the 
European Community in 1957, a large number of Directives has been adopted to create a more 
integrated economic market. Among these Directives, the Third Generation Insurance Directives 
implemented in 1994 constituted the most significant step so far of deregulation, with the 
introduction of a single EU license that allows insurers licensed in one EU country to write 
business in all EU countries without additional licenses having to be sought or being subject to 
regulations by host countries. An important objective of the Third Generation Insurance 
Directives was to increase competition by removing entry barriers. Consequently, we expect an 
increase in competition in the European life insurance markets in the period following the 
deregulation introduced by the Third Generation Directives. However, there are country factors 
such as legal systems, institutional and cultural characteristics, tax systems, and language that 
may serve as entry barriers and hamper competition. Therefore, the degree and evolution of 
competition may vary across European life insurance markets. 
                                                          
2 Choi and Weiss (2005) provide evidence supporting the efficient structure hypothesis for the US property-liability 
insurance industry and Berry-Stölze et al. (2011) provide evidence supporting the hypothesis for the European non-
life insurance industry. 
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The first step of our paper is to measure and evaluate competition in 10 European life 
insurance markets from 1999 to 2011, a period after the deregulation introduced by the Third 
Generation Directives. We measure competition using the Boone indicator.3 Bikker and van 
Leuvensteijn (2008) and Bikker (2016) are the only two insurance papers using the Boone 
indicator, and both analyze the Dutch life insurance industry. Bikker and van Leuvensteijn 
(2008) analyse the period 1995-2003 and find a weakening of competition in the last years of the 
sample period. Bikker (2016) analyses the Dutch life insurance industry as a whole as well as 
submarkets for the period 1995-2010, showing that competition is higher on the collective policy 
market and lower on the unit-linked market.  
Efficiency is often used as an indirect measure of competition. Theory suggests that 
increased competition would force insurance firms to drive up their efficiency. The empirical 
measurement of efficiency has triggered a large literature offering methods and techniques to 
measure economic efficiency. The development of frontier efficiency measurement techniques 
such as Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis have resulted in a large 
number of empirical papers measuring firm-level efficiency in different industries. For the 
insurance industry, the empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of European insurance 
markets in a cross-country setting is limited, and most extant studies show beneficial effects of 
deregulation on efficiency and productivity (e.g., Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). 
Nevertheless, among these studies, Diacon et al. (2002) show that technical efficiency declined 
from 1996 to 1999 in 15 European countries.  However, Fenn et al. (2008) analysing 14 
European countries for the period 1995-2001 find increasing returns to scale for the majority of 
EU insurers and that mergers and acquisitions facilitated by liberalised EU markets have led to 
efficiency gains. Berry-Stölze et al. (2011) analysing non-life insurers in 12 European countries 
                                                          
3 We calculated the Boone indicator of competition for each country for the sample period 1999-2011 by using 
company level data from 1998-2011. 
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for the period 2003-2007 provide support for the efficient structure hypothesis. Vencappa et al. 
(2013) find a decline in total factor productivity (TFP) growth in 14 European countries over the 
period 1995-2008 but raise concerns about the robustness of TFP growth estimates to different 
measures of insurance outputs. Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2016), analysing the same 10 
countries as in the present paper for the period 1998-2007, find an increase in both the average 
metafrontier cost efficiency as well as the average metafrontier revenue efficiency for the 10 EU 
life insurance markets as a whole, providing evidence of integration in the EU life insurance 
market.  
In European national markets, several studies have analysed efficiency and productivity 
covering a period following the deregulation introduced by the Third Generation Insurance 
Directives. Most of them show that the market experienced significant total factor productivity 
gains (e.g., Mahlberg and Url, 2003, for Austria; Barros et al., 2005, for Portugal; Cummins and 
Rubio-Misas, 2006, for Spain; and Mahlberg and Url, 2010, for Germany). Regarding the 
evolution of efficiency levels, Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) for the period 1989-1998 show 
that efficiency trended upwards in the Spanish insurance industry. Mahlberg and Url (2010), 
studying the German insurance industry for the period 1991-2006, provide evidence that the 
dispersion of cost efficiency scores declined over time. Bikker and Gorter (2011), analysing the 
restructuring of the Dutch non-life insurance industry for the period 1995-2005, show substantial 
scale economies and support both the efficient structure and the strategic focus hypotheses.  
The second part of our paper analyses the relationship between competition and 
soundness in EU life insurance markets. Life insurers need to remain in sound financial 
condition over many decades to pay out the promised benefits because most life insurance 
policies have a long life span. Hence, an important question is whether higher competition is 
good or bad for the financial soundness of life insurers. An increase in competition may force 
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life insurance prices downwards with a short-run advantage for consumers. But this alone could 
reduce the amount of insurance premiums raised, which could affect the profitability of the 
firms. Without sufficient profitability, life insurers may not be able to withstand unfavorable 
developments such as a decline of long-term interest rates. Therefore, in the longer term, 
consumers may suffer from competition if it tends to increase long-term risk with respect to 
insurance benefits. On the other hand, lower insurance prices resulting from increased 
competition may not necessarily lead to a decrease in profitability if such competition translates 
into increased cost efficiency. Furthermore, financial stability depends not only on profitability 
but also on other factors, such as risk and capitalization that can affect financial soundness.4 
An appropriate approach to evaluate the effects of competition on financial soundness is 
by testing the transmission mechanism hypothesis. This hypothesis, recently developed by 
Schaeck and Cihák (2014), posits that competition measured by the Boone indicator enhances 
financial stability, with efficiency being the transmission mechanism through which competition 
increases financial stability. Based on the industrial organization literature, an increase in 
competition could lead to an increase in efficiency, and efficiency improvements will in turn 
enhance financial stability. In this paper we follow a similar approach and test the transmission 
mechanism hypothesis for European life insurers. That is, we test whether competition, measured 
by the Boone (2008) indicator, increases life insurers’ soundness in 10 EU markets for the post-
deregulation period 2000-2011.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Regarding the appropriate level of capitalization that an insurer should maintain, Cummins and Nini (2002) argue 
that the objective is to attain an optimal level of insolvency risk that balances the marginal benefits (by reducing the 
associated expected costs of financial distress) and costs (agency costs, cost arising from adverse selection and 
moral hazard, regulatory costs and corporate income taxation) of holding equity capital. 
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3.  Empirical Modelling Strategy 
3.1. The Boone Indicator 
Several measures of competition have been developed in the empirical literature, which 
can broadly be classified as direct and indirect measures. Direct measures of competition include 
concentration (e.g., the Herfindahl index), rents, entry-exit rates, firm mark-up, and market share. 
Such “direct” measures are non-monotone in competition in that they can in some cases 
incorrectly show competition to have decreased (increased), when in fact competition may have 
increased (decreased). This has been increasingly recognised in the recent empirical literature on 
competition (e.g. Boone, 2008; Braila et al., 2010). Intensified competition is usually 
accompanied by two effects – a selection effect and a reallocation effect. With the selection 
effect, the least efficient firm active in the market sees a fall in its profits. With the reallocation 
effect, the profit of a more efficient firm increases relative to the profit of a less efficient firm. 
The direct measures of competition, although simpler to calculate, do not appropriately account 
for the reallocation effects and hence become non-monotone with competition.  
Indirect measures of competition have been proposed that are better grounded in theory, 
although more difficult to calculate and more sensitive to the specification chosen. The Boone 
(2008) indicator is one such indirect measure that captures the reallocation effect and produces a 
monotonic measure of competition. The Boone indicator is empirically modelled as a 
relationship between profitability and marginal costs. The rationale behind this indicator to 
capture the relationship between profitability and marginal costs is that in all markets, an 
increase in costs reduces profits but in a more competitive market the same percentage increase 
leads to a greater decline in profits because firms are punished more harshly for being inefficient. 
Hence, the elasticity of profit to costs will capture the degree of competition in that market - a 
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larger elasticity will indicate a more competitive market.5 
The Boone indicator is empirically constructed from a regression equation as: 
ln( )it it itmc         (1) 
where it  and itmc  measure the profits and marginal costs of life insurer i in year t, respectively. 
The parameter  , called the Boone indicator, is expected to be negative, reflecting that more 
efficient life insurers (with lower marginal costs) make higher profits. Therefore, increases in 
competition raise profits of more efficient firms relative to less efficient ones. The larger the 
absolute value of  , the stronger is competition.6  
While measures of profit are relatively easy to construct from financial accounts, 
marginal cost data cannot be observed directly. Boone et al. (2005) suggest using average costs 
as a proxy for marginal costs, and a number of subsequent papers estimating the Boone indicator 
have followed this approach (e.g., Bikker  and van Leuvensteijn, 2008; Schaeck and Cihák, 
2014).7 We also use average costs as a proxy for marginal costs in this paper to construct the 
Boone indicator from micro-level data to gauge the magnitude of the reallocation effect at the 
aggregate country level for the life insurance industry. 
To capture the evolution of the Boone indicator over time, equation (1) is modified to 
include year dummies and their interactions with the average cost variable as follows:  
it
T
t
tt
T
t
itttit DacD  



1
11
)ln(    (2) 
where it  is the profit of insurer i  in year 
t  as a proportion of its total assets,  itac   is average 
                                                          
5 The Boone indicator is also referred to as the profits elasticity approach to measuring competition.  
6 While the Boone indicator, through the estimated coefficient, is expected to be negative, there is no defined 
threshold to classify a market as being competitive or not. In general, the larger the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient, the stronger is competition. In addition, it is not unusual for empirical studies to report positive 
coefficients on the Boone indicator, particularly when measured over time (see e.g. Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011). 
7 Some attempts have also been made to estimate marginal costs from a cost function or cost frontier (e.g., Bikker 
and Leuveinsten, 2008; Van Leuveinsten et al., 2011) but this approach is not as straightforward when estimating 
multi-output cost functions. 
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variable costs, 
t
D  are dummy variables for years 1 to T, and it   is the error term. Equation (2) 
is estimated for each country separately, and the parameters 
t

 
are designed to capture the 
degree to which competition changes over time. 
To construct the variables in (2), we follow Boone (2008) and measure profits as the 
difference between variable revenues and variable costs, scaled by total assets.  Average variable 
costs are measured as the ratio of variable costs to variable revenues. Variable costs are 
constructed as the sum of net incurred claims and operating expenses, while variable revenues 
are calculated as the sum of net premiums and net investment income.  
3.2. The Nexus Between Competition, Efficiency and Soundness 
We examine the nexus between competition, efficiency and soundness through an 
empirical model that regresses soundness on competition and efficiency, controlling for firm and 
country-specific factors. Soundness of the insurance industry is measured by the Z-score, 
calculated for insurer i
 
at year t  in country j  as (see Laeven and Levine, 2009): 
ijtROA
ijtijt
ijt
EqAstROA
Z


   (3) 
where ROA is return on assets, EqAst is the equity to total assets ratio, and ROA  is the standard 
deviation of the return on assets.8 We use a three-year rolling window for ROA  to allow for 
variation in the denominator and to avoid the Z-scores being exclusively driven by the variation 
in the level of ROA and EqAst (see Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013; Schaeck, and Cihák, 2014).9  
The Z-score is an accounting measure of financial stability used for financial institutions 
both in insurance (e.g. Shim, 2011; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013; Mühlnickel and Weiβ, 2015) 
                                                          
8 We use profits before taxes in calculating ROA because using profits after taxes could make insurers from 
countries with higher tax rates appear less profitable (for a similar definition see e.g. Shim, 2011). 
9 In other words, the standard deviation of the rate of returns on assets of one specific year (e.g. 2000) is calculated 
as the average of the three-year rolling values (1998-2000). 
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and banking (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2008; Leaven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck, and Cihák, 
2014).  It shows the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to 
deplete the firm’s equity. Given that in insurance, as in banking, equity serves as a buffer against 
unforeseen losses and is critical to an insurer’s ability to meet its obligations, the Z-score can 
serve as an indicator of the insurer’s soundness (see Shim, 2011; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013). 
The Z-score is a measure of distance to default, which is inversely related to the probability of 
insolvency.  
The empirical model that examines the nexus between competition, efficiency, and 
soundness is given as: 
ijtjtijtjtijt
CountryFirmBooneZ  )ln(  (4) 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Z-score defined in equation (3), the 
Boone indicator is our country specific time-varying measure of competition, and Firm and 
Country represent firm-specific and country-specific variables, which are explained below. We 
use the logarithm of the Z-score to control for non-linear effects and outliers (see Demirgüc-Kunt 
et al., 2008; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013). 
  In equation (4), a negative sign on the coefficient of the Boone indicator variable would 
be interpreted as providing evidence that the reallocation effect of profits from inefficient 
insurers to efficient ones enhances soundness in the insurance industry.  
With regard to firm-level characteristics, we use the log of total assets in the regression to 
control for size. Reinsurance utilization (the ratio of ceded premiums to direct premiums plus 
reinsurance premiums assumed) is also included to account for differences in the quality of 
insurance services, risk management, performance, and conduct (Weiss and Choi, 2008).10 The 
                                                          
10 Ceding premiums reduces insurers’ insolvency risk by stabilizing loss experience, increasing capacity, limiting 
liability of specific risks, and/or protecting against catastrophes. In addition, reinsurance reduces agency costs by 
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ratio of invested assets to total assets is used to control for the efficiency of insurers’ accounts 
receivable management. An important insurance leverage ratio, the ratio of premiums to equity 
capital, is included as it has been shown to be related to firm performance and solvency in 
previous studies (e.g. Cummins, Rubio-Misas, and Zi, 2004). In addition, to control for 
ownership, we use a dummy variable taking value 1 if the decision making unit is a group of 
insurers and 0 if it is an unaffiliated single company.  
At the country level, we include two control variables for the main macroeconomic 
conditions under which the life insurers of each country are operating – the inflation rate and 
growth in real per capita GDP. The cumulative market share held by the 5 largest insurers is used 
to control for the effect of market structure. The life insurance penetration variable (ratio of life 
insurance premiums to GDP) is used to control for the level of insurance activity in the country 
where the firm is domiciled. We control for the size of the domestic insurance market using the 
log of total life premiums in each country. In addition, a crisis dummy is used to control for the 
period since the financial crisis started (i.e. 2008-2011). 
4.  Data and Sample Selection 
The data set we use for the analysis is an unbalanced panel of life insurers from 10 of the 
most important EU countries in terms of premiums volume spanning a 14-year-period from 1998 
to 2011.11 Annual financial statements are obtained from the ISIS database provided by Bureau 
van Dijk to construct the relevant variables of interest.  For each insurer, we use reports prepared 
under International Financial Reporting Standards/International Accounting Standards 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reducing incentive conflicts between the different stakeholders (Cummins et al., 2008). However, transferring risk to 
reinsurers is expensive. Reinsurance price can be several times the actuarial price of risk transferred (Froot, 2001). 
11 Countries included in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).  The last nine have the largest volume of life insurance premiums in 
the EU. Austria was included because its insurance market has been analyzed previously (Mahlberg and Url, 2003). 
Hence, the objective is to include relatively developed insurance markets. Using an unbalanced panel avoids 
survivorship bias. 
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(IFRS/IAS) where they exist, otherwise we use reports prepared under local generally accepted 
accounting principles. Consolidated data are used for groups of insurers and unconsolidated data 
for unaffiliated single insurance companies.12 All monetary variables are expressed in Euros and 
deflated by the country-specific Consumer Price Index (CPI) to base year 2000. Country-specific 
CPIs are obtained from the International Labor Organization (ILO). We eliminated non-viable 
firms such as those with non-positive incurred losses, invested assets, equity capital, total debt 
(including technical reserves), net premiums, or operating expenses. The resulting final sample 
has 6,584 firm-year observations. 
We augment the insurer financial statement data with country-level data obtained from a 
variety of sources. Information on stock market development (measured as the ratio of the value 
of total shares traded to average real market capitalization), banking sector development 
(measured as total claims of deposit money in banks and other financial institutions to domestic 
non-life financial sectors as a share of GDP), bond market development distinguishing between 
public bond market and private bond market (measured by the public domestic debt securities 
issued by government as a share of GDP and private domestic debt securities issue by financial 
institutions and corporations as a share of GDP, respectively), and life insurance penetration (the 
ratio of total life insurance premiums to GDP) were collected from the updated version of the 
World Bank database on financial development and structure (Beck et al., 2010, Cihák et al., 
2012). Data on governance characteristics were obtained from the 2013 updated World Bank 
database on governance indicators (see Kaufman et al., 2009). We use six dimensions of 
governance: political stability and absence of violence (capturing perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
                                                          
12 Unaffiliated insurance companies are associated to the country where they are domiciled. Group of insurers are 
linked to the country where the group is domiciled, although a group may have subsidiaries domiciled in different 
countries from the group. Groups’ subsidiaries are not included to avoid double counting. 
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including politically-motivated violence and terrorism), government effectiveness (capturing 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies), regulatory quality (capturing 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development), rule of law (capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence) voice and accountability (capturing perceptions 
of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media) and control of 
corruption (capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests (Kaufman et al., 2009, page 6). 
The ratio of the market share held by the five largest life insurers in each national market 
was obtained from the European insurance and reinsurance federation, Insurance Europe.13 The 
market share of foreign companies in total domestic life business was collected from the OECD 
insurance statistics database. Real per capita GDP, growth in real per capita GDP figures were 
sourced from the World Development Indicators and inflation rates from the Eurostat database. 
The data on market size (measured by total country life premium) were obtained from Insurance 
Europe. 
5.  Results and Discussion 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
                                                          
13 Insurance Europe, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, was formerly known as Comité Européen des Assurances 
(CEA) until 2012 (http://www.insuranceeurope.eu/). 
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Summary statistics of the mean values of the key variables used in the estimations by 
country for the whole period are shown in Table 1. In spite of the regulatory efforts of the EU to 
achieve a fully integrated European insurance market, many differences continue to exist 
between the national life insurance markets. Several such differences emerge from Table 1.  
At the firm level we note that the insurer’s   size (measured by its total assets) ranged 
from 1.577 billion Euros in Belgium to 27.734 billion Euros in the Netherlands; the 
capitalization ratio (equity capital to total assets) of life insurers varied from 4.5% in Austria to 
36.5% in Sweden; reinsurance utilization varied from 7.1% in Holland to 23.2% in the UK; and 
the net premiums to equity insurance leverage ratio ranged from 0.8 in Sweden to 8.1 in 
Belgium. At the country level the size of the market (measured by the total life premiums) 
ranged from 6.07 billion Euros in Austria to 164.0 billion Euros in the UK; the cumulative 
market share held by the five largest life insurers in each national market ranged from 38.4% in 
Germany to 73.8% in Sweden; the market share of foreign companies in total domestic life 
business ranged from 0.8 % in France to 34.6% in the UK; the life insurance penetration ratio 
extended from 2.6% in Austria to 11.5% in the UK. 
Differences in important environmental characteristics among countries could affect the 
competitiveness and soundness of EU life insurance markets. Table 1 reveals several differences 
in macroeconomic conditions. Real GDP per capita varied from around 20,808 Euros in Spain to 
40,039 Euros in Denmark, and inflation ranged from 1.49% in Sweden to 2.63% in Spain. Table 
1 also shows that stock market development ranged from 45.1% in Austria to 159.5% in Spain; 
the public bond market size ranged from 33.8% of GDP in Austria to 85.3% of GDP in Italy; and 
the private bond market ranged from 16.1% of GDP in the UK to 145.5% of GDP in Denmark. 
Banking sector development varied from 84.3% in Belgium to 165.4% in the Netherlands.  
Institutional and political factors also differ among the analysed EU countries. We 
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consider the six dimensions of governance described earlier and construct an indicator of 
institutional development by averaging these six indicators. These World Bank governance 
variables are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better governance. From Table 1, the political stability and absence of violence ranged from -
0.024 in Spain to 1.238 in Sweden; government effectiveness fluctuated from 0.569 in Italy to 
2.156 in Denmark; and regulatory quality extended from 0.926 in Italy to 1.796 in the 
Netherlands and Denmark. Overall, institutional development is lowest in Italy (0.664) and 
highest in Denmark (1.840).  
5.2. Boone Indicator Results 
While the Boone indicator of competition in equation (2) could be estimated using 
standard panel data techniques (controlling for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity), this would 
ignore the potential endogeneity arising from the possibility that cost and performance are jointly 
determined. For instance, large insurers could benefit from lower costs of production due to 
market power, which they could exploit to extract higher rents. Hence, tackling this endogeneity 
problem calls for an instrumental variables technique such as two-stage least squares (TSLS) or a 
more efficient estimator such as the two-step generalised method of moments (GMM). GMM 
uses an optimal weighting matrix and relaxes the independent and identically distributed 
assumption. We utilize the two-step GMM estimator for equation (2). One-year lags of the 
explanatory variables are used as instruments. The results on the estimated 
t
  are reported in 
Appendix 1.  
Tests for endogeneity reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Boone indicator in 
all cases except for Belgium and Sweden, justifying our instrumenting this variable. Since the 
equation is exactly identified, we could not carry out a test of over identification (i.e., testing for 
the validity of the instruments). However, the Anderson correlation coefficients test rejects the 
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null of under identification and low instrument relevance in all cases. With some minor 
exceptions, the coefficients are on the whole negative and statistically significant.  
The estimated 
t
  coefficients for each country measure the Boone indicators and these 
are graphed for each country in Figure 1. Given that a large negative value of the Boone 
indicator implies stronger competition, for most of the countries, competition levels appear to 
have decreased over time or in some cases have remained stable throughout the period. 
Table 2 compares the pre-crisis, post-crisis and whole period averages for the countries of 
interest. The average Boone indicator scores across the 10 EU countries for the pre- and post-
crisis periods were -0.130 and -0.101, respectively. This difference is statistically significant and 
suggests lower levels of competition on average in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-
crisis period. This finding is generally supported in the analysis of Boone indicators by country – 
7 out of the 10 life insurance markets show a decrease in competition in the post-crisis period 
compared to the pre-crisis period. 
To provide evidence on country characteristics that affect the competition of the EU life 
insurance markets we regress the Boone indicator on a set of country variables: 
jtjjtjtjt LegalGovernanceCountryBoone   3210  (5) 
where the dependent variable is the estimated Boone indicator of competition for  country j
 
at 
year t . Country is a matrix of independent variables capturing a set of time-varying country 
characteristics, Legal is a dummy variable capturing the legal system followed by the country 
and Governance represents the evolution of six dimensions of governance quality in each 
country over time.  
We follow previous international insurance studies in selecting country environmental 
factors that may affect competition in the life insurance market (e.g. Arena, 2008; Beck and 
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Webb, 2003; Pope and Ma, 2008; and Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2016). The country level 
variables considered in the analysis include the size of the market (measured by the log of the 
country’s total life insurance premium), market structure (measured by the five-firm 
concentration ratio), life insurance penetration (measured as the ratio of life insurance premium 
to GDP), the market share of foreign companies in total domestic life premiums, stock market 
development (captured by the stock turnover ratio which measures the activity or liquidity of the 
stock market relative to its size), debt market development, distinguishing between public bond 
market and private bond market, banking sector development.14 In addition, we add two control 
variables for macroeconomic conditions:  growth in real per capita GDP and the inflation rate. 
We also account for the legal system of the country, as it has been found to be a major 
determinant of the protection and enforcement provided to external creditors and shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1998). We use dummy variables to capture countries’ legal systems:  French 
civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, with English common law being the omitted 
category. The regressions also test for country governance quality, proxied by individual 
indicators of political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, and control of corruption as described earlier. As 
the six governance measures are correlated, they are included individually in the regression 
analysis. Finally, we include a crisis dummy variable to control for any potential mitigating 
effect on competition arising from the start of the financial crisis (i.e. 2008-2011). 
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients between the Boone indicator variable and the 
non-governance control variables (Panel A), and correlations between the Boone indicator and 
the governance variables (Panel B). Recall that lower (more negative) values of the Boone 
(2008) indicator signify stronger competition, and hence a positive sign means that an increase in 
                                                          
14 The stock market turnover ratio is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. 
19 
 
this variable is correlated with a fall in competition and conversely for a negative sign. The 
negative and significant correlation between the Boone indicator and the size of the market is as 
expected, since larger markets create new opportunities and attract new entrants hence raising 
competition. Higher life penetration is significantly associated with higher competition, as 
expected. The five-firm concentration ratio, which is often used to measure competition 
correlates positively with the Boone measure of competition, as expected. The foreign market 
share in total domestic life of business proxies a decline in entry barriers and consequently we 
would expect that an increase in competition correlates with higher values of this variable, as is 
the case here with statistical significance. 
 As life insurance products include an important component of assets accumulation, we 
can expect a more competitive life insurance market in countries with well-developed financial 
markets where possible substitutes for life insurance products exist, such as banking products, 
stocks and bonds. The observed bivariate correlation coefficients suggest this is the case for 
countries with developed stock markets, banking sector and public bond markets. Countries with 
developed private bond markets appear to have lower competition levels. We expect better 
economic conditions, as reflected in higher levels of real per capita GDP growth and lower 
inflation level, to be associated with higher competition levels. Our bivariate correlation 
coefficients suggest this is not the case for real per capita GDP growth and inflation.  
We expect a negative correlation between the Boone indicator and each of our 
governance variables, as higher values of the governance variables reflect higher quality of 
governance which are expected to increase market competition. Panel B of Table 3 suggests a 
positive and significant correlation between the Boone indicator and each of the six governance 
indicators. 
The panel data nature of equation (5) raises the need to control for the unobserved 
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heterogeneity problem normally present in the presence of countries with potentially different 
characteristics. We approach this issue by applying OLS on equation (5), controlling for the 
unobserved country fixed effects through country dummy variables.15 The results are presented 
in Table 4, starting with a model where no governance indicator is included (column 1), followed 
by six models that include each of the six different governance indicators.  
To begin with, there is strong evidence that the larger the market, the lower the level of 
competition. Higher life insurance penetration is associated with higher competition in EU life 
insurance markets across all models. The size of the public bond market is associated with lower 
level of competition across all measures of governance indicator, while under the measure of 
government effectiveness there is evidence that banking sector development is associated with 
lower competition.  
The coefficients on the three dummy variables representing the country legal system are 
positive and significant in all models except for the French dummy variable under the measure of 
regulatory quality which is not significant. These results provide evidence that the greater 
protection of shareholder and creditor rights provided by the English common law system (the 
omitted category) leads to higher competition in the EU life insurance market compared to 
alternative legal systems. Among the governance variables, only regulatory quality is positive 
and significant, suggesting higher quality governance along this dimension reduces competition 
in EU life insurance markets. This finding suggests that competition is impeded when policy 
makers implement regulations permitting and promoting private sector development. 
5.3. Results on Competition, Efficiency, and Soundness 
The nexus between competition, efficiency, and soundness controlling for firm and 
                                                          
15 We ran the Hausman test to decide between the fixed effects model and the random effects model. These tests 
were not always conclusive, but on balance, were in favour of the fixed effects model. Given the need to identify the 
coefficients on time invariant variables such as the country legal system, we ran the long form of the fixed effects 
model, i.e. applying OLS on a regression model with country dummy variables. 
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country characteristics is captured by equation (4). In this equation, the Boone indicator is 
potentially an endogenous variable since weaker insurers may increase their insolvency risk by 
underwriting large amounts of risky policies, which in turn can be misinterpreted as a sign of 
increased competition. To address this potential endogeneity concern, we estimate equation (4) 
using the two stage least squares instrumental variable regression. We use two instruments for 
the Boone indicator - an institutional development index and the interaction of real GDP per 
capita and market share of foreign companies in total domestic life premiums. The institutional 
development variable is an average of the six governance indicators described earlier, and 
proxies good governance in a country, which is an important precursor for competition. The 
interaction of real GDP per capita and foreign market share will increase whenever the country is 
wealthy (measured by the real GDP per capita), or the decline in entry barriers (measured by the 
foreign market share in total domestic life of business) increases, or when both increase, 
signalling aggressive competition between firms. 
The regression results are reported in Table 5, with bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses, to correct for the generated regressor problem.16 Focusing on the first column of 
Table 5, which is our key regression, we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Boone 
indicator. In addition, we observe that for the overall Z-score, the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that these instruments are valid. The results show 
that the coefficient of the Boone indicator variable is negative and significant at the 1% level 
indicating a positive relationship between competition and soundness in the European life 
                                                          
16 Given that the second stage model includes variables constructed from parameters of the first stage regressions 
(the Boone indicator in this case), the covariance matrix of the second-stage estimator includes noise induced by the 
first-stage estimates. A number of papers have derived the asymptotic variance for two-stage estimation in different 
contexts (for a review, see Karaca-Mandic and Train, 2003) but these do not cover all possible applications. 
Bootstrapped standard errors provide a practical approach that avoids theoretical calculations of the correct standard 
errors where the distribution of the generated regressors is unknown (see Guan, 2003). 
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insurance markets. This result lends support to the transmission mechanism hypothesis which 
posits that efficiency is the channel through which competition is translated to soundness, since 
the Boone indicator captures competition via a reallocation effect to more efficient life insurers.  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 5 also provide evidence of the effects of competition on the 
three components of Z-score (ROA, EqAst, and ROA ). This analysis allows us to understand the 
driving forces behind the hypothesized mechanism from competition to soundness via efficiency 
in the 10 insurance markets analysed in this study. Results from the ROA analysis show that the 
coefficient of the Boone indicator is negative and significant, providing support that competition 
positively affects profitability. Regarding the regression analysis of the capitalization ratios, the 
coefficient of the Boone indicator is positive and significant, suggesting that competition may 
incentivize EU life insurers to hold less capital. Consequently the effects of competition on EU 
life insurers’ capital ratios do not drive the Z-scores. This finding is in line with Cummins and 
Nini (2002) who find that capital over-utilization primarily represents an inefficiency for which 
insurers incur significant revenue penalties. Holding equity capital in an insurance company is 
costly due to agency cost from unresolved owner-manager and owner-policyholder conflicts, the 
cost of adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance underwriting and claims settlement, 
corporate income taxation as well as other market frictions (Cummins and Nini, 2002).17 
Therefore higher competition levels may incentivise firms to hold less capital and reduce these 
market frictions.  
On the other hand, our results show a positive effect of competition in reducing the 
volatility of profits since the coefficient of the Boone indicator is positive and significant in the 
model where ROA  is the dependent variable. To sum up, these findings indicate that competition 
                                                          
17 Related to this issue, Gaganis et al. (2015) provides evidence of a nonlinear inverted U-shaped relationship 
between capital requirement and European insurers’ performance. 
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drives Z-scores higher basically through the reallocation of profits and the reduction in the 
volatility of profits to the extent that they compensate for the incentive to reduce capital ratios. 
In addition, following Lepetit et al. (2008), Barry et al. (2011) and Doumpos et al. 
(2015), we disaggregate the Z-score into two additive ratio parts: ROA/ ROA  and EqAst/ ROA .
18 
The first part is an inverse measure of insurer portfolio risk (known as a measure of risk-adjusted 
returns). The second part is an inverse indicator of leverage risk (known as a measure of risk-
adjusted capitalization). Columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 provide evidence of the effects of 
competition on these two ratio components of Z-score. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficients of the Boone indicator in these two regressions indicate that competition reduces 
both portfolio risk and leverage risk. 
The crisis dummy we include in the Z-score regression is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level suggesting that financial stability did not worsen in the EU life 
insurance industry since the financial crisis started.19 One possible explanation is the increase in 
capital ratios of European life insurers that took place since the financial crisis started, as 
confirmed by a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the crisis dummy variable in 
the capital ratio regression. 
Finally, we conducted an additional analysis to determine whether the effect of 
competition on soundness depends upon the insurers’ financial health. To this effect, we explore 
if weak insurers may respond in a different way to competition than healthier insurers (i.e., 
insurers with higher Z-scores). To address this question, we use quantile regression because it 
provides information about the impact of regressors conditional upon the distribution of the Z-
                                                          
18 We follow Lepetit et al. (2008), Barry et al. (2011) and Doumpos et al. (2015) in constructing these two 
components but using original rather than average values. Using average values produce similar results. 
19 This finding is observed for weak insurers and also for financially healthy ones as we can see in the later analysis 
(see Table 6), with the crisis dummy variable being positive and significant in all five percentiles in the quantile 
regressions. 
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score. Given our earlier concerns around the endogeneity of the Boone indicator, we instrument 
it in the quantile regressions using the same instrumental variables as described earlier. The 
quantile regressions are carried out in two stages. In the first stage we run an OLS regression of 
the Boone indicator on the instruments and other independent variables in the model. The fitted 
values of the dependent variable are then used in place of the Boone indicator in the second stage 
quantile regressions.  
The quantile regression results are presented in Table 6, which reports the coefficients for 
the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution of Z-scores, with bootstrapped 
standard errors reported in parentheses. The coefficient of the Boone indicator of competition is 
negative and significant in all five percentiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th). We use an F-test to 
determine whether the coefficients of competition are equal across percentiles. This test rejects 
the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients, suggesting heterogeneous responses of the Z-score 
to competition. We observe a decreasing magnitude of the Boone indicator coefficient across the 
percentiles. Since the higher percentiles of the Z-scores identify financially healthy insurers, 
these findings suggest that the soundness-enhancing effect of competition is larger for weak 
insurers than for financially healthy ones. 
5.4. Robustness Checks 
We subject our findings to a battery of further robustness tests.20 The main result that 
competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets is robust to (i) using an 
alternative approach to calculate the Z-score, i.e., by employing a three-year rolling window for 
all three components of the Z-score (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 
2013); (ii) using a different set of instruments for the Boone indicator of competition;21 and (iii) 
                                                          
20 The additional results are available from the authors upon request. 
21 The alternative instruments are the regulatory quality governance indicator and the interaction term of real GDP 
per capita and the market share of foreign companies in total domestic life premiums. 
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using year dummy variables in our model instead of a crisis dummy variable.22 
The finding that the effect of competition on soundness is not homogeneous across 
financially weak and financially healthy life insurers prevails when applying the previous 
robustness test. A decreasing magnitude of the Boone indicator coefficients in the 25th , 50th, 75th 
and 90th percentiles is generally observed except in some limited instances when the alternative 
set of instruments are used.  
Finally, following Beck et al. (2013) we use a subcomponent of the Z-score, the (negative 
of the) natural logarithm of the standard deviation of an insurer’s return on assets as an 
alternative measure of soundness in the quantile regression analysis. We instrument the Boone 
indicator using the same variables described earlier. The results confirm that the effect of 
competition on financial soundness is not homogeneous across financially weak and financially 
healthy life insurers. Although these results did not show the same decreasing trend from lowest 
to highest percentiles, the coefficient of the Boone indicator of competition was negative, 
significant and larger in absolute values in the first percentile (10th), providing support that the 
financially soundness-enhancing effect of competition is larger for weak insurers that for 
financially healthy ones. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the debate about whether the deregulation brought about by the 
1994 EU Third Insurance Generation Directives led to increased competition in the EU life 
insurance sector and whether increasing competition improves the soundness (measured by the 
                                                          
22 We also estimated the Boone indicator at the firm-year level using the semi-parametric smooth coefficient model 
(see Brissimis and Delis, 2011 and Clerides et al., 2015 for applications of semi-parametric methods) and used them 
in equation (4). This method however produced a significantly large number of positive values for the firm-year 
measures of the Boone indicator of competition. Running equation (4) on a reduced sample of only the negative 
values for the Boone indicator, we still established that competition significantly enhances the soundness of the EU 
life insurance market held and that the soundness-enhancing effect of competition is larger for weak insurers than 
for financially healthy ones. 
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Z-score) of the life insurance industry. Using a novel measure of competition, the Boone (2008) 
indicator, we find no evidence of any improvement in competition over the period 1999-2011. If 
anything, we note that most of the 10 countries in our study experienced a worsening of 
competition in their life insurance sector during that period. Our investigation of the relationship 
between competition and financial soundness reveals a positive link between the two: higher 
levels of competition are found to significantly increase the financial soundness of the industry. 
However, this effect is not homogeneous across financially weak and financially healthy life 
insurers. We find evidence that higher levels of competition have a larger impact on the solvency 
of weaker insurers than on healthier insurers. 
Our findings offer some potentially useful insights to policymakers in terms of designing 
policies to promote competition. The fact that competition levels, as measured in this paper, did 
not improve, and even deteriorated, should raise concerns about the workings of the single life 
insurance market, nearly two decades after the Third Insurance Directive. It is possible that 
country specific factors such as legal systems, institutional and cultural characteristics, tax 
systems, and language still act as significant “natural” entry barriers, hampering competition. In 
designing policies to promote competition in this sector, our results suggest that weaker insurers 
would benefit from increased levels of solvency if exposed to higher levels of competition.  
As the process of EU expansion continues, issues surrounding competition and whether it 
enhances soundness in EU financial markets will become more pertinent. Member states with 
established pro-competitive policies will push for similar policies in other member states to 
achieve a level playing field for all members participating in the single market. More research is 
therefore needed to understand how EU competition policies evolve over time. 
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Table 1: Mean Values of Key Variables by Country  
This table reports mean values of the variables used in the estimation. The firm level variables presented are financial soundness (Z-score as constructed in equation 3), the 
components of the Z score (i.e. return on assets and its standard deviation, and the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity/Total Assets)), the firm’s use of reinsurance (Ceded 
Premiums/Direct Premiums plus Reinsurance Premiums Assumed), the efficiency of insurers’ account receivable management (Invested Assets/Total Assets), the insurance 
leverage ratio (Net Premiums/Equity) and size of the firm (proxied by the log of total assets). The country level variables are size of the market (proxied by the log of total 
life insurance premiums), market structure (Five-Firm Concentration Ratio), market share of foreign companies in total domestic life business, life insurance penetration and 
measures of stock market development, public bond market development, private bond market development and banking sector development. Macroeconomic indicators – 
real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita growth as well as inflation rate are also included. We also report mean values of seven indicators of a country’s governance as 
defined earlier in the paper. Variables in monetary value are expressed in constant 2000 Euros. 
 
 Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain France UK Italy Holland Sweden All 
Firm Level Variables 
Z-Score  22.884 9.301 4.152 6.084 7.417 12.361 5.650 10.813 11.810 13.418 7.310 
Return on Assets  0.005 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.013 0.025 0.005 
Std. Deviation of Return on Assets 0.003 0.019 0.026 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.023 0.008 0.015 0.040 0.020 
Equity/Total Assets 0.045 0.112 0.078 0.095 0.110 0.069 0.106 0.070 0.132 0.365 0.092 
Use of Reinsurance 0.213 0.118 0.106 0.077 0.075 0.091 0.232 0.096 0.071 0.094 0.115 
Invested Assets/Total Assets 0.977 0.940 0.950 0.961 0.949 0.937 0.934 0.953 0.917 0.960 0.946 
Net Premium/Equity 4.373 8.110 6.181 1.701 4.104 2.766 6.429 5.716 2.029 0.794 5.024 
Size of the Firm (billion Euros) 2.404 1.577 4.278 7.090 1.613 11.493 20.088 5.423 27.734 13.088 8.348 
Country Level Variables 
Size of the Market (billion Euros) 6.070 16.379 69.814 9.888 20.037 100.130 163.998 54.718 21.633 14.625 69.536 
Five-Firm Concentration Ratio 0.705 0.673 0.384 0.655 0.439 0.540 0.479 0.631 0.585 0.738 0.489 
Foreign Market Share 0.290 0.028 0.195 0.168 0.117 0.008 0.346 0.233 0.221 0.114 0.187 
Life Insurance Penetration 0.026 0.059 0.033 0.059 0.027 0.065 0.115 0.044 0.046 0.053 0.051 
Stock Market Development 0.451 0.467 1.307 0.780 1.595 0.919 1.239 1.315 1.331 1.147 1.224 
Public Bond Market Development 0.338 0.681 0.399 0.452 0.383 0.527 0.348 0.853 0.439 0.368 0.461 
Private Bond Market Development 0.445 0.399 0.401 1.455 0.409 0.434 0.161 0.316 0.627 0.468 0.442 
Banking Sector Development 1.106 0.843 1.113 1.654 1.574 0.945 1.574 0.910 1.628 1.049 1.233 
Real GDP per capita (thousand Euros) 34.959 33.454 32.297 40.039 20.808 29.275 30.440 25.670 33.584 37.163 30.576 
Real per Capita GDP Growth (%) 4.735 2.912 3.703 2.701 1.717 2.595 2.059 2.045 3.535 3.249 2.910 
Inflation (%) 1.986 2.163 1.527 2.200 2.631 1.644 2.093 2.200 1.987 1.493 1.879 
Voice & Accountability 1.391 1.383 1.374 1.610 1.182 1.233 1.358 1.018 1.577 1.579 1.330 
Political Stability No Violence 1.154 0.822 0.921 1.155 -0.024 0.591 0.499 0.535 1.069 1.238 0.724 
Government Effectiveness 1.828 1.677 1.628 2.156 1.276 1.593 1.754 0.569 1.911 1.995 1.552 
Regulatory Quality 1.558 1.309 1.529 1.796 1.227 1.151 1.740 0.926 1.796 1.588 1.450 
Rule of Law 1.862 1.321 1.658 1.907 1.194 1.402 1.676 0.546 1.756 1.876 1.490 
Control of Corruption 1.918 1.397 1.831 2.416 1.172 1.387 1.883 0.391 2.133 2.247 1.625 
Institutional Development 1.618 1.318 1.490 1.840 1.004 1.226 1.485 0.664 1.707 1.754 1.362 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 87 139 2567 402 672 683 872 693 313 156 6584 
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Figure 1: Boone Indicator 1999-2011 
The figure below represents the evolution of the Boone indicators for each country over time. These indicators are 
effectively line plots of the estimated parameters βt from equation (2) for each country, as reported in the Appendix table.  
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Table 2: Boone Indicators 
This table reports the average values of the Boone (2008) indicator for the whole, pre- and post-crisis period for every 
of the 10 EU countries of the sample as well as across the 10 EU countries. The last column reports differences in 
mean Boone indicator values between the post- and the pre-crisis period. ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Country 
Average 
(1999-2011) 
Pre-Crisis 
Average 
(1999-2007) 
Post-Crisis 
Average. 
(2008-2011) 
Difference 
Between Post- 
and Pre-Crisis 
Average 
Austria -0.131 -0.128 -0.136 -0.009*** 
Belgium -0.067 -0.069 -0.065  0.003* 
Germany -0.097 -0.116 -0.059  0.058*** 
Denmark -0.079 -0.083 -0.070  0.013*** 
Spain -0.190 -0.194 -0.186  0.008*** 
France -0.101 -0.106 -0.092  0.014*** 
UK -0.159 -0.178 -0.113  0.065*** 
Italy -0.165 -0.162 -0.172 -0.010*** 
Netherlands -0.129 -0.128 -0.132 -0.004* 
Sweden -0.020 -0.025 -0.011  0.014*** 
All Countries -0.120 -0.130 -0.101 0.032*** 
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Table 3: Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A of the table provides correlation coefficients between the Boone (2008) indicators and the country non-governance variables as well as correlation coefficients between the 
country non-governance variables. Panel B reports correlation coefficients between the Boone (2008) indicators and country governance variables as well as correlation 
coefficients between the country governance variables. ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Boone Life 
Insurance 
Penetration 
Size of the 
Market 
Five Firm 
Concentration  
Ratio 
Foreign 
Market Share 
Stock 
Market 
Development 
Public Bond 
Market 
Development 
Private Bond 
Market 
Developmetn 
Banking 
Sector 
Development 
Real per 
Capita GDP 
Growth 
Inflation 
Boone Indicator 1           
Life Insurance Penetration -0.210*** 1          
Size of the Market -0.074*** 0.478*** 1         
Five-Firm Concentration Ratio 0.166*** 0.160*** -0.392*** 1        
Foreign Market Share -0.118*** 0.363*** 0.286*** 0.0274** 1       
Stock Market Development -0.230*** -0.112*** 0.164*** -0.223*** 0.314*** 1      
Public Bond Market Development -0.038*** -0.120*** -0.061*** 0.489*** -0.098*** -0.069*** 1     
Private Bond Market Development 0.269*** -0.165*** -0.603*** 0.255*** -0.230*** -0.297*** -0.089*** 1    
Banking Sector Development -0.161*** 0.224*** -0.157*** 0.0690*** 0.233*** 0.124*** -0.363*** 0.409*** 1   
Real per Capita GDP Growth 0.020 -0.029** 0.012 -0.0155 0.018 0.163*** 0.008 -0.036*** -0.118*** 1  
Inflation -0.188*** 0.007 -0.193*** 0.134*** 0.027** 0.304*** 0.145*** -0.059*** 0.146*** 0.258*** 1 
 
Panel B 
 Boone Voice  and 
Accountability 
Political Stability 
No Violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule 
 of Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Boone Indicator 1       
Voice and Accountability 0.427*** 1      
Political Stability No Violence 0.491*** 0.478*** 1     
Government Effectiveness 0.374*** 0.799*** 0.549*** 1    
Regulatory Quality 0.288*** 0.807*** 0.410*** 0.771*** 1   
Rule of Law 0.474*** 0.818*** 0.491*** 0.884*** 0.857*** 1  
Control of Corruption 0.403*** 0.855*** 0.556*** 0.909*** 0.872*** 0.947*** 1 
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Table 4: Determinants of Boone Indicator  
This table reports the results of estimating equation (5), where the dependent variable is the estimated Boone 
indicator of competition for country j at year t. We estimate equation (5) using OLS, with country dummy variables 
amongst the explanatory variables to capture unobserved country-level heterogeneity. In addition to some of the 
explanatory variables explained in table 1, we include dummy variables capturing the legal system of the countries 
in the sample: French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law, with English common law as the 
omitted category. A crisis dummy variable is also included to control for the period since the financial crisis started. 
Since the six country governance indicators are correlated, they are included individually in the regression analysis, 
starting with model 1, where no governance indicator is included. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
***,**,*  represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 No 
Governance 
Political 
Stability 
Govt. 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice & 
Accountabilit
y 
Control of 
Corruption 
        
Size of Market 0.068** 0.063** 0.065** 0.055* 0.068** 0.068** 0.068** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) 
Five-firm Concentration Ratio 0.013 0.010 0.022 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.015 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.031) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) 
Life Insurance Penetration -1.372** -1.273** -1.336** -1.355** -1.373*** -1.372*** -1.374*** 
 (0.536) (0.532) (0.523) (0.570) (0.451) (0.520) (0.461) 
Foreign Market Share 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) 
Stock Market Development -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Public Bond Market Development 0.056** 0.057*** 0.053* 0.062** 0.057** 0.057** 0.058** 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Private Bond Market Development -0.040 -0.039 -0.044 -0.033 -0.040 -0.040 -0.043 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
Banking Sector Development 0.019 0.017 0.022* 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
Real per Capita GDP growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
French Law 0.082** 0.084*** 0.078** 0.051 0.082** 0.082** 0.081*** 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.038) (0.031) 
Germanic Law 0.139** 0.136** 0.133** 0.103* 0.139** 0.139** 0.140** 
 (0.062) (0.056) (0.059) (0.055) (0.060) (0.068) (0.059) 
Scandinavian Law 0.229*** 0.231*** 0.222*** 0.202*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) 
Governance Indicator  -0.009 0.010 0.040** -0.001 -0.000 0.005 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.015) 
Financial Crisis Dummy 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Belgium 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.103*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) 
Germany -0.117 -0.107 -0.106 -0.082 -0.117* -0.117 -0.116* 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.074) (0.074) (0.065) (0.082) (0.069) 
Denmark 0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.015 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
Spain -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.071*** -0.052** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.014) (0.019) 
France -0.050 -0.050 -0.041 -0.002 -0.050 -0.050 -0.045 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.052) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) 
UK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy -0.122*** -0.125*** -0.104*** -0.077* -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.115*** 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) (0.039) (0.042) 
Netherlands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sweden 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.389*** -0.366*** -0.403*** -0.404*** -0.386*** -0.388*** -0.400*** 
 (0.102) (0.092) (0.105) (0.083) (0.130) (0.116) (0.112) 
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 
R-Squared 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.878 0.875 0.875 0.875 
36 
 
Table 5: Regression of lnZ score and Components on Boone Indicator, Firm and Country 
Characteristics 
This table reports the regression results for equation (4), where the dependent variables are the natural log of the Z 
score alongside each of its components (ROA, Equity/ Total Assets, σROA), all observed for firm i at year t. In 
addition, we also report results for the ratio components of the Z-score, ROA/σROA which measures the inverse of 
insurer portfolio risk, and (Equity/Total Assets)/σROA, which measures the inverse of insurer leverage risk. The 
estimated Boone indicator is one of the independent variables alongside others defined in table 1. We include a 
dummy variable capturing the effect of the financial crisis. We use the two-stage least squares estimator, 
instrumenting the Boone indicator. The endogeneity test reported rejects the null that the Boone indicator is an 
exogenous variable. The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments used are valid. ***,**,* means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln(Zscore) ROA Equity/Total 
Assets 
σROA ROA / σROA (Equity/Total 
Assets) / σROA 
Boone Indicator -5.502*** -0.029* 0.153** 0.081*** -2.416*** -13.712*** 
 (0.423) (0.016) (0.070) (0.006) (0.826) (3.617) 
Firm Size -0.242*** 0.001* -0.031*** -0.000 0.025** -1.741*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.093) 
Group 0.046 -0.003 0.015** 0.002*** -0.124 0.328 
 (0.049) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.078) (0.320) 
Ceded Premium/Gross Premium -0.076 0.008*** 0.020** 0.006*** 0.319*** -0.185 
 (0.062) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.068) (0.383) 
Invested Assets/Total Assets -2.447*** 0.015 -0.356*** -0.004 -0.124 -16.430*** 
 (0.225) (0.013) (0.044) (0.002) (0.416) (2.427) 
Net Premium/Equity -0.015 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.031 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) 
Market Size 0.083*** -0.005*** -0.031*** -0.007*** -0.126** 0.826*** 
 (0.029) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.049) (0.216) 
Inflation 0.029 0.001 -0.003 -0.001** 0.036 0.214 
 (0.019) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.025) (0.150) 
Five-firm Concentration Ratio 5.230*** 0.004 0.062*** -0.070*** 1.450*** 26.646*** 
 (0.122) (0.004) (0.021) (0.002) (0.227) (1.248) 
Life Insurance Penetration 0.545 0.073*** 1.133*** 0.120*** 0.009 -0.446 
 (0.688) (0.026) (0.097) (0.007) (1.043) (4.886) 
Real GDP Growth 0.014*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.005* 0.062*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.014) 
Financial Crisis Dummy 0.227*** 0.001 0.011** -0.005*** -0.122** -0.196 
 (0.037) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.055) (0.246) 
Constant -0.127 -0.002 0.489*** 0.093*** -0.059 3.854 
 (0.248) (0.013) (0.046) (0.003) (0.535) (2.796) 
Observations 4681 4733 4733 4733 4733 4733 
R-Squared 0.478 0.019 0.310 0.386 0.046 0.297 
Endogeneity Test Statistic 206.337*** 5.807*** 1.955 137.110*** 5.762*** 25.762*** 
Sargan Test Statistic 0.057 0.153 1.787 15.442*** 0.113 0.114 
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Table 6: Two-Stage Quantile Regressions of lnZ score on Boone Indicator, Firm and 
Country Characteristics 
This table reports results from applying two-stage quantile regression on equation (4), with the dependent variable 
being the natural log of the Z-score for firm i at year t. The first stage runs an OLS regression of the estimated 
Boone indicators on appropriate instruments and other independent variables. The predicted values of the dependent 
variable from the first stage are then used as one of the independent variables in a second stage quantile regression 
of the lnZ score on the variables of interest. ***,**, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 10th  
percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
Boone Indicator -8.392*** -7.477*** -5.687*** -4.276*** -1.625** 
 (0.779) (0.453) (0.440) (0.592) (0.785) 
Firm Size -0.131*** -0.193*** -0.226*** -0.253*** -0.276*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Group -0.102 0.005 -0.017 0.034 0.051 
 (0.092) (0.067) (0.059) (0.057) (0.085) 
Ceded Premium/Gross Premium -0.104 -0.189** -0.233*** -0.148*** -0.177** 
 (0.103) (0.074) (0.051) (0.055) (0.080) 
Invested Assets/Total Assets -2.313*** -2.027*** -2.135*** -1.937*** -2.649*** 
 (0.331) (0.302) (0.240) (0.259) (0.335) 
Net Premium/Equity -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
Market Size 0.459*** 0.257*** 0.125*** -0.031 -0.182*** 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.029) (0.033) (0.053) 
Inflation 0.037 0.027* 0.027 0.011 0.052 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.033) 
Five-firm Concentration Ratio 6.135*** 5.406*** 5.153*** 4.924*** 4.610*** 
 (0.245) (0.156) (0.120) (0.116) (0.181) 
Life Penetration -10.749*** -3.656*** 1.327 5.580*** 10.237*** 
 (1.261) (1.240) (0.907) (0.752) (1.109) 
Real GDP Growth 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Financial Crisis Dummy 0.136* 0.282*** 0.176*** 0.154*** 0.109** 
 (0.070) (0.045) (0.034) (0.047) (0.051) 
Constant -2.761*** -1.641*** -0.366 0.639** 2.525*** 
 (0.447) (0.406) (0.265) (0.310) (0.347) 
Observations 4681     
F stat (equality of coefficients) 70.649***     
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Appendix 1: Boone Indicator Regressions 
Notes: This table reports the results of running equation (2), with the estimated parameters βt represented by the year coefficients presented here. We omit the 
coefficients on the year intercept dummies (γt) for space considerations. ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain France UK Italy Holland Sweden 
           
Year 1999 -0.147*** -0.076 -0.117*** -0.083*** -0.199*** -0.119*** -0.180*** -0.178*** -0.116*** -0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.047) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.024) 
Year 2000 -0.147*** -0.052 -0.116*** -0.095*** -0.234*** -0.122*** -0.188*** -0.180*** -0.140*** -0.044** 
 (0.010) (0.092) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) 
Year 2001 -0.167*** -0.058 -0.118*** -0.094*** -0.219*** -0.099*** -0.188*** -0.169*** -0.123*** -0.069*** 
 (0.013) (0.045) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024) 
Year 2002 -0.146*** -0.068* -0.123*** -0.092*** -0.189*** -0.096*** -0.200*** -0.168*** -0.124*** -0.022 
 (0.008) (0.035) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.020) (0.033) 
Year 2003 -0.127*** -0.059** -0.117*** -0.068*** -0.164*** -0.094*** -0.182*** -0.152*** -0.136*** -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.025) (0.012) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.030) 
Year 2004 -0.111*** -0.071** -0.138*** -0.070*** -0.152*** -0.109*** -0.171*** -0.157*** -0.139*** -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.028) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.033) 
Year 2005 -0.120*** -0.079*** -0.115*** -0.080*** -0.170*** -0.106*** -0.139*** -0.159*** -0.118*** -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.008) (0.026) (0.007) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) 
Year 2006 -0.112*** -0.066*** -0.104*** -0.079*** -0.180*** -0.109*** -0.174*** -0.153*** -0.117*** 0.035 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.065) 
Year 2007 -0.124*** -0.075*** -0.092*** -0.084** -0.228*** -0.089*** -0.187*** -0.146*** -0.142*** -0.023 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.033) (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) 
Year 2008 -0.153*** -0.091*** -0.074*** -0.085*** -0.173*** -0.092*** -0.145*** -0.179*** -0.187*** 0.019 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.013) (0.053) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.047) (0.060) 
Year 2009 -0.139*** -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.204*** -0.057*** -0.136*** -0.149*** -0.122*** -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.005) (0.014) (0.017) (0.006) (0.019) (0.026) (0.044) (0.036) 
Year 2010 -0.132*** -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.189*** -0.113*** -0.085*** -0.179*** -0.084*** -0.026 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024) 
Year 2011 -0.119*** -0.072 -0.049*** -0.073*** -0.173*** -0.105*** -0.097*** -0.182*** -0.139*** -0.035 
 (0.013) (0.055) (0.006) (0.012) (0.029) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.026) 
Observations 77 101 2333 352 549 577 649 577 243 116 
Endogeneity Test Statistic 23.342** 17.995 85.697*** 19.731 22.320* 27.724*** 64.519*** 24.918** 42.616*** 16.451 
Anderson Correlation 53.780*** 28.316*** 1830.720*** 26.130*** 96.981*** 337.513*** 285.940*** 122.371*** 72.002*** 23.459*** 
Shea Partial R-Squared 0.777 0.829 0.942 0.606 0.719 0.761 0.679 0.863 0.740 0.764 
 
 
